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We use British panel data to investigate single women’s labor supply
changes in response to three reforms that affected individuals’ work
incentives. We use these reforms to identify changes in labor supply.
There is evidence of small hours of work effects for two of such
reforms. A third reform in 1999 instead led to a signiﬁcant increase
in single mothers’ hours of work. The mechanism by which the labor
supply adjustments were made occurred largely through job changes
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rather than hours changes with the same employer. This is little over-
all effect of the reforms on wages.
I. Introduction
The use of the canonical model of labor supply for policy analysis is
pervasive. A central tenet of this model is that workers have ﬂexible
choices over hours ofwork, selectingtheirdesiredutility-maximizinglevel
at any given wage. A number of studies have cast some doubt on this
model by arguing that there is not free choice of hours within a job and
limited choice across jobs, and providing evidence of job “packages”
whereby wage and hours are tied together.
1 Most of the contributions in
this literature, however, identify hours constraints by relying on observed
individual characteristics (e.g., number and age of children, or job mo-
bility) or stated labor supply preferences (Ham 1982; Mofﬁtt 1984; Lund-
berg 1985; Altonji and Paxson 1988; Stewart and Swafﬁeld 1997; Euwals
2001). These two strategies are problematic because changes in labor sup-
ply preferences or other individual variables may not be exogenous to
hours levels or changes.
Our strategy is to use a sequence of policy reforms that directlyaffected
the labor supply incentives of speciﬁc groups of individuals while leaving
the incentives faced by others unchanged. Our objective is to use these
reforms to assess the degree of ﬂexibility of hours changes within and
across jobs. The emphasis is more on the extent of within- and between-
job ﬂexibility—whether it is large or small and for which type of workers
it is larger or smaller—rather than on the question of whether hours
ﬂexibility is complete or not. Speciﬁcally, we analyze transitions from
positive hours of work to positive hours of work made by single women
in response to (exogenous) tax and beneﬁt policy changes that occurred
in Britain in the 1990s. We use three different reforms to highlight likely
actual movements along the labor supply curve and combine these with
information on stated preferences and job mobility to assess whether and
how women adjust their labor supply in response to changes in the in-
centives to work a given number of hours.
Many of the tax and beneﬁt reforms in the United Kingdom, Canada,
and the United States have been directed at increasing the labor market
attachment of the lower-skilled workers, in particular, those facing high
ﬁxed costs of work such as child care (Blundell 2002). A signiﬁcant part
of the rise in employment among single mothers in the United States over
the late 1980s and 1990s has been attributed to the expansionoftheEarned
Income Tax Credit (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum
2001). Similarly, it has been argued that much of the rise in the partici-
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pation of single mothers in the United Kingdom has been due to increases
in the generosity of the tax credit policies, namely Family Credit (FC)
and Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC).
2 The self-sufﬁciency exper-
iment in Canada provided further experimental evidence on the effec-
tiveness of ﬁnancial incentives on the working decisions of low-income
single parents (Card and Robins 1998). An interesting feature of the U.K.
reforms has been the changing incentive structure toward part-time and
full-time work engendered by these reforms. Not only has employment
responded to these reforms but so has the distribution of weekly hours
of work (Blundell et al. 2000; Brewer 2001). However, the mechanism
for these adjustments in labor supply has not been studied. Are adjust-
ments to hours made by moving jobs, or do workers adjust their hours
of work over time withthesameemployer?Thismechanismofadjustment
is the focus of this article.
For such an analysis panel data are essential, as it is necessary to know
the employment position and hours worked of each speciﬁc individual
before and after adjustment takes place. Since 1991 a high-quality panel
data survey, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), has been col-
lected annually for Britain, and that is the data source we use in our
analysis covering the period 1991–2002. The BHPS also has the attraction
of recording individuals’ stated preferences toward hours of work, so that
actual movements can be examined alongside changes in stated pref-
erences.
Even if hours were completely ﬁxed within jobs but mobility between
jobs was costless, we would still expect workers to be located on their
labor supply curve, that is, at their most preferred level of hours given
the market wage. But if there are individual costs to moving between jobs
or ﬁrms collectively require a given number of hours because of facing
ﬁxed costs or technology-related coordination requirements,
3 then work-
ers will face immobility (at least in the short run) on the hours they can
work. This has implications for the interpretation of data on actual and
preferred hours of work, rates of mobility between jobs, and estimating
models of labor supply. Various strands of research have suggestedmodels
of hours choice in which hours are ﬁxed within jobs. One strand, which
dates back to Barzel (1973) and Rosen (1976), grounds its analysis in
models in which jobs are packages of ﬁxed hours-wage combinations
(Ham 1982; Mofﬁtt 1984; Lundberg 1985; Altonji and Paxson 1988, 1992;
Biddle and Zarkin 1989; Kahn and Lang 1991; Dickens and Lundberg
2 Blundell and Hoynes (2004) and Brewer et al. (2006) present a comprehensive
review of the evidence.
3 Card (1990) argues that constraints are the result of nonconvexities in the
relationship between output and individual hours due to start-up costs or other
aspects of the technology used.424 Blundell et al.
1993). Another more recent strand is developed within a monopsonistic
environment, where employer preferences play a key role in determining
hours of work in a given job (Manning 2003).
In this study we are interested in examining if and how employed single
mothers vary their hours in response to exogenous changes in the incen-
tives to work a given level of hours. For this purpose, we use reforms to
the tax and beneﬁt system that changed the hours conditions for FC in
1992 and 1995 and the attractiveness of work through WFTC in 1999 to
assess the “canonical” model of hours ﬂexibility. We also look at how
changes in hourly wages both within and between jobs relate to the in-
troduction of the reforms. Although this analysis can be biased by the
usual endogeneity problems, it is likely to give us a more exhaustive
picture of the British labor market and an indication of the possible pres-
ence of imperfections or technological rigidities.
Besides providing us with relatively “clean” experiments to test hours
constraints, these three tax/beneﬁt reforms (especially the WFTC pro-
gram) have also been widely analyzed in previous studies (Bingley and
Walker 1997; Blundell et al. 2000; Gregg and Harkness 2003; Blundell
and Hoynes 2004; Brewer et al. 2006; Francesconi and van der Klaauw
2007). These studies have come up with broadly consensual evaluations
of the reforms’ effects on a number of outcomes, including employment
and wages. None of these studies, however, focuses on changes in worked
hours. Stewart and Swafﬁeld (2004) examine the working hours of low-
wage employees in the United Kingdom but analyze the impact of the
introduction of the National Minimum Wage in April 1999 rather than
the impact induced by reforms that potentially changed the incentive to
work a given number of hours per week. Their results indicate that the
minimum wage had a negative effect on hours worked by low-wage
women, although they do not show how single women with and without
children have been differentially affected. In addition, neitherthesestudies
nor the earlier research on wage-hours packages analyzes job-changing
behavior as a mechanism to adjust hours of work or address the broader
issue of labor supply adjustment.
4
We ﬁnd that the introduction of the WFTC reform in 1999 led to a
substantial increase in single mothers’ hours of work. This adjustment
4 There has been relatively little analysis of hours constraints in Britain. Two
studies that have investigated the extent of constraints on desired hoursareStewart
and Swafﬁeld (1997) and Bryan (2007). Using data from the BHPS, they both
ﬁnd that a substantial proportion of male workers (Stewart and Swafﬁeld) and
male and female workers (Bryan) are not putting in the hours they would like,
with most of the dissatisﬁed workers wishing to work fewer hours per week.
Both studies, however, abstract from the way in which job changes are related
to hours changes and, more broadly, from the issue of the path of labor supply
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primarily occurred through job changes rather than labor supply adjust-
ments within a job. There is a good deal of heterogeneity in the effects
of the WFTC reform, with evidence of even less adjustment within jobs
emerging among single mothers whose youngest child was aged 0–4 and
who worked in larger ﬁrms, service industries, and the public sector. The
presence of some hours inﬂexibility within jobs is conﬁrmed when we
look at hours changes by stated labor supply preferences. Women who
stated that they were unconstrained intheirjobshowedthelargestupward
adjustments after the WFTC reform if they changed jobs. Similarly, and
again in line with their stated preferences, overemployed women showed
the largest downward adjustments after the 1992 FC reform (which re-
duced the minimum work requirement to receive FC from 24 to 16 hours
a week) only if they changed jobs. Finally, we ﬁnd relatively little effect
on wages. However, there is some weak evidence that certain groups of
women (especially single mothers who lived in London and the South
East) operated under monopsonistic conditions, whereby changing jobs
led to signiﬁcantly lower wages after the introduction of WFTC.
Our research is likely to be relevant for many aspects of labor market
policy, especially for the design of tax credit and beneﬁt policies that
specify a minimum number of hours of work per week as a precondition
for entitlement to a given payment (e.g., the Working Tax Credit and the
current demonstration project for the Employment Retention and Ad-
vancement Scheme in the United Kingdom). From the result that hours
are not very ﬂexible within jobs, we can infer that changes to the tax/
beneﬁt incentives to work a given number of minimum hours are likely
to inﬂuence rates of job-to-job transitions for the affected groups of
workers.
Section II brieﬂy explains the rules and structure of the FC/WFTC
programs and discusses our estimation approach and identiﬁcation strat-
egy. Section III introduces the data and describes the variables used in
the analysis. Section IV presents the empirical results, and Section V sum-
marizes our main results.
II. “In-Work” Beneﬁt Reforms in the United Kingdom
A. Institutional Background
Programs to support low-income working families with children (here-
after called “in-work beneﬁts,” even though the more recent programs
are ofﬁcially designated tax credits) have a long history in the United
Kingdom. A peculiar feature of the United Kingdom’s in-work beneﬁts
is that awards depend not just on the earned and unearned income and
family characteristics, but also directly on (weekly) hours of work: since426 Blundell et al.
their inception, in-work beneﬁts have been available only to families with
children who usually work some minimum number of hours a week.
5
Two in-work beneﬁts were in operation during our sample period:
Family Credit, which existed from April 1988 until September 1999, and
the Working Families’ Tax Credit, which existed from October 1999 until
March 2003.
6 In April 1992, the minimum work requirement in FC fell
from 24 to 16 hours a week. This occurred between the ﬁrst two waves
of the BHPS. The impact of this reform on single parents’ labor supply
is ambiguous: those working more than 16 hours had an incentive to cut
hours to (no less than) 16, whereas those previously working fewer than
16 hours had an incentive to increase their labor supply to (at least) the
new cutoff. In 1995, there was another reform to FC, in the form of an
additional (small) credit for those adults working full-time (i.e., 30 or
more hours a week). This reform affected the labor supply decisions of
lone parents in obvious ways: there was an increased incentive for those
working fewer than 30 hours to increase their hours to 30, but an income
effect meant that those already working at least 30 hours had an incentive
to cut their hours worked to no fewer than 30.
The 1999 WFTC reform has a more complicated impact on labor sup-
ply. WFTC was more generous than FC in three ways: it had higher
credits, particularly those for young children; families could earn more
before the beneﬁt began to be withdrawn; and it had a lower withdrawal/
taper rate. Overall, the reform increased the attractiveness of working 16
or more hours a week compared to working fewer hours. But the last of
the three aspects of the reform meant that the biggest income gains were
experienced by families just at the end of the FC taper (i.e., familieswhose
earnings had reduced their entitlement to FC just to zero), who tended
to be working full-time (Blundell et al. 2000). The expected impact of the
WFTC reform on lone parents’ labor supply, conditional on working 16
or more hours, is as follows: (i) people receiving the maximum FC award
will face an income effect away from work, but not below 16 hours a
week; (ii) people working more than 16 hours and not on maximum FC
will face an income effect away from work (but not below 16 hours a
5 Hours rules are an important feature of the United Kingdom’s welfare system
more generally. Receipt of the basic safety net welfare beneﬁt (Income Support
or income-related Jobseekers’ Allowance) is conditional on both working less
than a certain number of hours and having a sufﬁciently low income. For parents,
the hours rules for welfarebeneﬁts and in-workbeneﬁtsarealignedsothatfamilies
can never be entitled to both.
6 Since 1998, the transfer system affecting lone parents has undergone nearly
continuous reform. However, the most important change, in terms of both gov-
ernment expenditure and potential labor supply effects, was the introduction of
WFTC. We do not want to claim, however, that there has been a stable postreform
period since October 1999. On this and other related and concurrent policy
initiatives, see the discussion in the next subsection.Job Changes and Hours Changes 427
week) and a substitution effect toward work; (iii) people working more
than 16 hours and earning too much to be entitled to FC but not WFTC
(“windfall beneﬁciaries”) will face income and substitution effects away
from work if they claim WFTC (see Blundell and Hoynes 2004; Brewer
et al. 2006).
7
The occurrence of such reforms (i.e., the 1992 fall in hours requirement
for FC, the 1995 additional credit for working full-time, and the intro-
duction of the WFTC program in 1999) means that we can divide our
sample into three periods: (a) autumn 1991 to March 1995, with the
postreform period (which in our analysis we label FC, i.e., under the in-
work beneﬁt regime of FC) covering the years 1992–94; (b) April 1995
to September 1999, with the postreform period (labeled FC) being de-
ﬁned over the years 1995–97; and (c) October 1999 to the end of the
sample, with the postreform period (labeled WFTC) being between 1999
and 2002.
8 In our empirical analysis we take advantage of each of these
separate reforms: not only did they have the potential to affect single
mothers’ hours of work, but they also could have done so in opposite
directions. However, although we use this three-group categorization,
most of our analysis will only isolate the 1992 and 1999 reforms (as the
additional credit under FC was small) and focus on the few years im-
mediately following the introduction of each policy change.
B. Analytical Framework and Identiﬁcation Issues
To assess whether female labor supply adjustments operate through job
changes in response to exogenous changes in the incentives to work a
given number of hours, we estimate four different speciﬁcations of a
simple model of hours changes. We perform this assessment using a dif-
ference-in-difference method (Ashenfelter 1978; Heckman and Robb
1985); that is, we identify the FC and WFTC effects on single mothers’
behavior through the differential tax and beneﬁt treatment that they re-
ceive as compared to a control group, which is given by single women
7 It is worthwhile noticing that, for all three reforms, work incentives were
likely to be dampened for single mothers living in areas with high child care costs
or high house rents (e.g., London and the South East of England). The availability
of a more generous child care tax credit component under WFTC might reduce
this problem (Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007), although highandincreasing
rents had to be weighed within the trade-off between additional tax credit gains
and lower Housing Beneﬁt entitlements (Gregg and Harkness 2003). In Sec. IV.B
we will present and discuss estimation results obtained after stratifying the sample
by child’s age, housing tenure, and region of residence.
8 In Sec. IV.A we shall return to the deﬁnition of the postreformperiods.Brewer
(2001) has a detailed time line of reforms to in-work beneﬁts between 1971 and
2000. This does not reﬂect the reforms in April 2003, which lie outside our sample
and which are described in Brewer (2003).428 Blundell et al.
without children.
9 The main identiﬁcation condition underlying this ap-
proach is that, other than the introduction of the changes in in-work
beneﬁts, there are no contemporaneous shocks that affect the relative
outcomes of the treatment and control groups. Therefore, identiﬁcation
relies on the assumption that variation in labor supply preferences of
single parents be independent of the reforms conditional on the observed
covariates and time effects.
10
At the time of the introduction of the 1999 reform, however, there were
other shocks that might have inﬂuenced single mothers’ and childless
women’s labor supply differently. Three policy changesinparticularcould
have interacted with the WFTC effects. First, there was an increase in
basic child beneﬁts under Income Support (the main welfare beneﬁt, sim-
ilar to Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Temporary Aid to
Needy Families in the United States) between 1998 and 1999. In terms
of labor supply, however, this increase implies a negative income effect
that could lead to a downward bias in our effect estimates. Our estimates
may then represent a lower bound of the true effect. Second, the National
Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced in April 1999 (Dickens and
Manning 2004; Stewart 2004). The NMW might have affected both the
extensive margin of labor supply (inducing inactive women to get a job)
and the intensive margin (increasing the incentives for working women
to work more hours). But such incentives presumablyhadthesameimpact
on single mothers’ behavior that they did on single childless women’s.
The NMW-related shock, therefore, is not likely to have changed the
employment outcomes of the treatment group differently than those of
the control group.
Third, between July 1997 and October 1998, the British government
launched a series of New Deal programs intended to help differentgroups
of low-income people move from welfare into work using a combination
9 The choice of single women without children as the control group in our
analysis is somewhat arbitrary. Albeit not eligible to receive FC or WFTC because
they do not have children, these women are different from single mothers along
a number of observable characteristics (see Sec. III). Most of the existing studies
on the effect of in-work beneﬁts on lone mothers use the same control group
that is used here, whether they look at the United Kingdom (Blundell et al. 2000;
Gregg and Harkness 2003; Blundell and Hoynes 2004; Francesconi and van der
Klaauw 2007) or the U.S. experience (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Ro-
senbaum 2001). Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) lay out theidentiﬁcationconditions
for such an analysis. Their credibility in the context of the analysis of tax reform
is further discussed in Heckman’s (1996) comment on Eissa (1996). In Sec. IV,
however, we perform some sensitivity analysis in which the control group is
restricted to single childless women with lower educational attainment.
10 In general, conditioning can be accomplished nonparametrically by combin-
ing matching and difference in differences. We ﬁnd that this makes very little
difference to our estimates, which condition linearly on covariates.Job Changes and Hours Changes 429
of intensive job search assistance and small basic skills courses (Blundell
et al. 2002; Van Reenen 2004). One of such initiatives, the New Deal for
Lone Parents (NDLP), was aimed at all lone parents in receipt of Income
Support with children under 16 and whose youngest child was over 5
years and 3 months (from April 2000 this lower age cutoff was dropped
to 3).
11 Under NDLP, lone parents were assigned to a personal advisor,
whom they were supposed to meet once every 2 weeks to receive advice
on job vacancies, in-work beneﬁts, child care arrangements, training, and
job search techniques. One interesting aspect of NDLP, which was shared
with some (but not all) other New Deal programs, was that involvement
in the scheme and searching for work were entirely voluntary, and beneﬁt
entitlements did not depend on whether people decided to enter the
scheme or not.
12 Single women without children were not involved in a
similar initiative, unless they too were longer-term unemployed and had
low income. Therefore, NDLP and any of the other New Deal schemes
were likely to affect women—whether single mothers or not—only to
the extent that they were unemployed. But since unemployed and out-
of-the-labor-force women are excluded from our analysis (in fact, women
must be employed for at least two consecutive years to be included in
our sample; see Sec. III), the inﬂuence of NDLP on hours changes is
likely to be limited. In any case, as single mothers, on average, have less
education and are more likely to be unemployed, we performedsensitivity
checks that will be discussed in Section IV.A by replicating our analysis
using a more restricted control group, consistingofsinglechildlesswomen
with low educational attainment.
Turning to the model speciﬁcations, let denote the change in total Dhit
(usual and overtime) weekly hours of work between year and year t  1
t; let be a dummy variable that is equal to one if woman i is a lone dit1
mother at time , and zero otherwise; and let be equal to one if t  1 Qit
11 Eligibility for and provisions of the various New Deal schemes have slightly
changed over time. In relation to NDLP, since 2002 lone parents are eligible for
NDLP not only if they are in receipt of Income Support (as they were in previous
years) but also if they receive other beneﬁts (such as Housing Beneﬁt and Council
Tax Beneﬁt) and, importantly, WFTC (as well as maternity allowance and stat-
utory maternity pay). Also eligible are lone parents working under 16 hours per
week (and thus ineligible for WFTC) who are not claiming any beneﬁts except
child beneﬁts. All these changes, however, were implemented outside our sample
period.
12 Compulsory Work Focused Interviews (CWFI) for lone parents claiming
Income Support were introduced in April 2001. Under CWFI, people of working
age seeking to claim Income Support are obliged to participate in a work-focused
interview with an advisor at the start of their claim as a condition of receiving
the beneﬁt. Kirby and Riley (2004) ﬁnd little evidence that CWFI increased labor
market participation among inactive beneﬁt-claiming lone mothers.430 Blundell et al.
woman i changes a job between years and t, and zero otherwise. t  1
The four speciﬁcations are as follows:
Dh p a  a d  a Q  b dQ I (1992 ≤ t ≤ 1994) it 01 it12 it FC it1 it
   b dQ I (1999 ≤ t ≤ 2002)  X g   ,( 1 ) WFTC it1 it it it
Dh p a  a d  a Q  (a  a d )d(t) it 01 it12 it 31 32 it1
 b dQ I (1992 ≤ t ≤ 1994) FC it1 it
   b dQ I (1999 ≤ t ≤ 2002)  X g   , (2) WFTC it1 it it it
Dh p a  a d  a Q  (a  bd )I(1992 ≤ t ≤ 1994) it 01 it12 it 3F C it1
 (a  bd )I(1999 ≤ t ≤ 2002) 4W F T C it1
 b dQ I (1992 ≤ t ≤ 1994) FC it1 it
   b dQ I (1999 ≤ t ≤ 2002)  X g   , (3) WFTC it1 it it it
and
Dh p a  a d  a Q  a QI (1992 ≤ t ≤ 1994) it 01 it12 it 21 it
 a QI (1999 ≤ t ≤ 2002) 22 it
 (a  bd )I(1992 ≤ t ≤ 1994) 3F C it1
 (a  bd )I(1999 ≤ t ≤ 2002) 4W F T C it1
 b dQ I (1992 ≤ t ≤ 1994) FC it1 it
   b dQ I (1999 ≤ t ≤ 2002)  X g   , (4) WFTC it1 it it it
where is a function indicating that the event w occurs; in equation I(w) d(t)
(2) is a linear time trend; is a vector of individual characteristics mea- Xit
sured either at or between and t; and is an independently t  1 t  1 it
and identically distributed error term. The variables in X, described in
detail in the next section, are a cubic polynomial in total work experience;
dummy variables for race, educational qualiﬁcation, ﬁrm size, public sec-
tor, region of residence, housing tenure, union coverage, and industry;
the number and changes in the number of children by age group; and
changes in health status and local unemployment rate.
13 The treatment
effects for movers are captured by bFC and bWFTC, whereas and bFC
13 The levels of time-varying variables are all measured at . t1Job Changes and Hours Changes 431
capture, respectively, the FC and WFTC treatment effectsforwork- bWFTC
ers who did not change jobs (stayers).
14
The key differences across equations (1)–(4) involve the speciﬁcation
of time trends. In equation (1), time trends are not modeled, except those
operating through bFC and bWFTC. Equation (2) instead allows for group-
speciﬁc linear time trends (captured by a31 and a32), and in equation (3),
we have a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation with group-speciﬁc discrete jumps
for stayers after both the 1992 and 1999 reforms ( and ). Finally, bb FC WFTC
equation (4) introduces even greaterﬂexibilitybyallowingdifferenttrends
in job-changing behavior after each reform (through a21 and a22). If
(with , WFTC), we cannot statistically reject the hypoth- ˆ ˆ b p b j p FC jj
esis of within-job ﬂexibility in hours choice; whereas if is statistically ˆ bj
smaller than , there is evidence of hours constraints within jobs. ˆ bj
Estimation of (1)–(4) is performed using ordinary least squares (OLS).
However, because our regressions refer to changes,
15 all individual time-
invariant permanent unobservables that enter additively in the determi-
nation of hours levels are eliminated from the estimation. In computing
the standard errors, we take advantage of the fact that we have multiple
observations over time, and thus we allow for arbitrary serial correlation.
III. Data
The data we use come from the ﬁrst 12 waves of the BHPS collected
over the period 1991–2002. Since autumn 1991, the BHPS has annually
interviewed a representative random stratiﬁed sample of the population
of Great Britain with about 5,500 households covering more than 10,000
individuals. All adults and children in the ﬁrst wave are designated as
original sample members. Ongoing representativeness of the nonimmi-
grant population has been maintained by using a “following rule” typical
of household panel surveys: at the second and subsequent waves, all orig-
inal sample members are followed (even if they moved houses or if their
households split up), and there are interviews, at approximately 1-year
intervals, with all adult members of all households containing either an
original sample member or an individual born to an original sample mem-
ber whether or not they were members of the original sample. The sample
14 It is worth noting at this point that were ﬁrms to adjust their overall shift
lengths in response to these changes in desired labor supply, there could be im-
portant spillover effects on other workers in our control group. We have not been
able to locate any evidence either way on changes in shift length (or, more gen-
erally, in labor demand) at the time of these reforms in Britain, but it would
clearly be useful to document evidence on this.
15 Women with 0 hours at the time of any of the 12 interviews are excluded
from the analysis. For further discussion on this point, see Sec. III.432 Blundell et al.
therefore remains broadly representative of the population of Britain as
it changes over time.
16
Our estimation sample includes employed unmarried, noncohabiting
females (separated, divorced, widowed, or never married) who are at least
16 years old and were born after 1941 (thus aged at most 60 in 2002).
Because equations (1)–(4) refer to changes in hours worked, we measure
hours changes conditional on being in work in period and remaining t  1
in work in period t. We exclude any female who was in school full-time
or self-employed or out of the labor force in a given year.
17 The sample
includes 2,284 women who have been observed working at least two
consecutive times over the sample period and at some point were living
alone, of whom 1,122 are lone mothers and the remaining 1,162 are child-
less. In line with the Inland Revenue’s deﬁnition, a child must be aged
16 or less (or be under the age of 19 and in full-time education) to count
as a dependent child for whom the single mother is responsible. Although
only 16% of the women are observed in the same marital state for all 12
years of the panel, about 60% of them are observed for at least 7 years
in the same state. The resulting sample size, after pooling all available
years for both groups of women, is 12,359 observations (4,585 lone moth-
ers and 7,774 childless women). Of the 1,280 single women in the 1999
wave of interviews, 25 lone mothers and 32 childless women (about 4.5%
of the sample in that year) were interviewed just before the day on which
the 1999 reform was implemented (October 5). To limit problems of
interpretation, they were dropped from the estimating sample. Their in-
clusion, however, does not alter any of our main results.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the outcomes and characteristics
of the two groups of women, which we use as covariates in the empirical
analysis below. There are some noticeable differences between the two
groups.
18 Lone mothers are younger (30 vs. 38 years), less educated (56%
16 Of the individuals interviewed in 1991, 88% were reinterviewed in wave 2
(1992). The wave-on-wave response rates from the third wave onward have been
consistently above 95% (i.e., 95% of the previous wave respondents get inter-
viewed). Detailed information on the BHPS is presented in Lynn et al. (2006) and
can be obtained at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/doc/. The households
from the European Community Household Panel subsample (followed since the
seventh wave in 1997), those from the Scotland and Wales booster subsamples
(added to the BHPS in the ninth wave), and those from the Northern Ireland
booster subsample (which started in wave 11) are excluded from our analysis.
17 Excluding women who were long-term ill or were registered disabled, but
satisﬁed the other sample selection restrictions, did not change any of the results
presented below. In the present analysis, such women are included in the esti-
mating sample.
18 Restricting our analysis to women who work for at least two consecutive
periods leads to a sample of women who are more educated and less poor than
those who are observed out of the labor market more frequently. But cruciallyJob Changes and Hours Changes 433
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable
Unpartnered
Women without
Children Lone Mothers
Total weekly hours of work 34.74 (13.25) 25.61 (14.20)
Change in worked weekly hours* .39 (11.40) 2.25 (12.31)
Absolute change in worked weekly
hours* 6.00 (9.62) 6.91 (10.28)
Hourly pay 7.06 (6.01) 5.85 (5.19)
Monthly labor income conditional on
working positive hours (in 2002 £’s) 1,110 (911) 694 (629)
Age (years) 38.1 (15.0) 30.00 (11.36)
Nonwhite .043 .090
Registered disabled .049 .023
Number of children by age group:†
0–4 .231 (.510)
5–10 .588 (.755)
11–18 .798 (.771)
House owner .578 .541
In social housing .229 .377
A-level or higher educational
qualiﬁcation .520 .438
No qualiﬁcation .152 .144
University degree or more .144 .060
Total work experience (years) 14.33 (11.47) 8.67 (7.88)
Employed in a ﬁrm with fewer than 50
workers .660 .746
Employed in service industries‡ .838 .820
Employed in the public sector .247 .171
Union covered .514 .530
Changed job during previous year .167 .179
Local unemployment rate§ .065 (.032) .063 (.031)
Number of person-wave observations 7,774 4,585
Number of women 1,162 1,122
Note.—The ﬁgures are means (standard deviations in parentheses) computed over all person-wave
observations for which two consecutive years of data are available.
* The change is measured over two consecutive years.
† Averages are computed over the entire subsample of lone mothers. If computed over the three
speciﬁc subsamples of lone mothers with children in each child group, the means (standard deviations)
are 1.172 (.448), 1.318 (.582), and 1.321 (.548), respectively.
‡ Service industries refer to banking, ﬁnance and insurance, distribution, hotels and catering,transport
and communication, and other services (which include education and sanitary services).
§ Computed over 306 travel to work areas.
have qualiﬁcations short of A level vs. 48% among childless women, and
only 6% of lone mothers have a university degree vs. 14.4%),
19 more
likely to be nonwhite (9% vs. 4.3%) and in social housing (38% vs. 23%),
less likely to be employed in the public sector (17% vs. 25%), and have
fewer years of work experience. The two groups of women are instead
the differences between treatment and control groups in this larger sample (con-
taining also women who are out of the labor market) are very similar to those
found in the more restricted sample used in the article.
19 For non-British readers, “A (advanced) level” corresponds to education be-
yond high school but short of a university degree.434 Blundell et al.
relatively similar in terms of job-changing behavior, with 17% of childless
women and 18% of single mothers moving across employers in any two
given years.
20 Systematic differences emerge again in the case of labor
market outcomes. Compared to unmarried women without children, lone
mothers work about 9 fewer hours per week, earn £1.20 less per hour
and nearly £420 less per month, and report a larger change in worked
hours from one year to the next (an increase of 2.25 hours per week vs.
less than 25 minutes).
21
To gain a greater insight into how the reforms might have changed the
distribution of hours worked among all single women, ﬁgure 1 plots
histograms of total weekly hours of work for all women in the sample
by survey year (with the vertical line in each panel indicating theeligibility
hours cutoff).
22 Women can be found working any number of hours from
1 to 60 per week in any given year. In most years, we observe a great
deal of variability, with bunching at about 20, 30, and 35–40 hours and,
depending on the year, at some hours between 40 and50 (seealsoBlundell,
Duncan, and Meghir 1998; Blundell and Hoynes 2004). A striking feature
is that, in every year up to 1996 (perhaps with the exclusion of 1991),
there was only a small fraction of workers below the eligibility cutoff
(accounting for about 15%–20% of the single women in the sample),
whereas in the two years prior to the 1999 reform, therewasclearevidence
of bunching just below the 16-hour cutoff. From 1999 onward, the frac-
tion of female workers with total weekly hours between 16 and 20 was
around 12%, almost twice as large as the fraction of workers in the same
hours range between 1992 and 1998. These features of the data provide
some quantitative indication of the hours effect associated with WFTC.
From 1998 onward, also discernible is a greater concentration of workers
20 Our measure of job change does not include internal promotions or job
changes within the same ﬁrm or establishment, but includes all moves from one
ﬁrm to another (through either quits or layoffs). Alternative deﬁnitions of job
change (e.g., dropping laid-off workers from the pool of movers or dropping
promoted workers from the group of the stayers) produce results similar to those
reported in this article. See also Sec. IV.C.
21 To account for potential differential attrition over the panel and individual/
item nonresponse in each speciﬁc wave, we recomputed group-speciﬁc means
using weighted data (with either cross-sectional or longitudinal enumerated in-
dividual weights). The results (not shown) are very similar to those obtained with
unweighted data and presented in table 1, suggesting that the problems induced
by panel attrition and changing sample composition are likely to be relatively
small in our data. We shall return to some of these issues while performing
sensitivity analysis (see Sec. IV.C).
22 For the sake of visual clarity, ﬁg. 1 does not show the observations with more
than 60 weekly hours. These, however, represent less than 1% of the subsamples
in each survey period and are included in the regression analysis reported below.Job Changes and Hours Changes 435
at 30 hours, but we cannot detect any substantial change around the 30-
hour cutoff immediately after the introduction of FC.
We now turn to mean hours changes. Figure 2 plots the time trends
for the year-on-year average changes in total hours worked over the sam-
ple period (with the dotted lines around the averages displaying the cor-
responding one-standard-deviation bands). Figure 2a shows the trends
for all working women distinguishing lone mothers (straight line) from
single childless women (dashed line), and ﬁgures 2b and c display the
trends for female workers who moved between jobs and for workers who
stayed with the same employer, respectively. The data reveal that changes
in hours worked among unmarried women without children are small
and stable, ranging between 0 and 1 hour per week over the entire period
(ﬁg. 2a). The mean hours changes for lone mothers instead are greater,
and their time variability is higher too. The largest hours change is ob-
served after the introduction of WFTC between 1998 and 1999, when
lone mothers reported, on average, an increase of about 4.5 hours of work
per week.
23 But, after 1999, lone mothers seem to have adjusted their
hours changes downward. The 1992 reform, which reduced the hours
requirement for FC eligibility from 24 to 16 per week, increased single
mothers’ labor supply by about 2.5 hours, but again this increase was not
followed by further increases in subsequent years. The additional FC for
those working 30 or more hours does not appear to be associated with
substantial changes in hours worked immediately after its introduction
in 1995, but it is followed by a steady increase even before the peak
between 1998 and 1999.
Figure 2b shows that the largest changes are experienced by women
who moved between jobs, with lone mothers reporting an average change
in hours of about 4 per week over the whole sample period and unmarried
women without children of1 perweek.Thetimepatternsforlonemothers
are similar to those reported in ﬁgure 2a, although the peak in 1998–99
is followed by a further increase over the subsequent year. Lone mothers’
increase in hours between 1991 and 1992 is also sizable, with an average
close to 4 hours per week. Hours changes among those who stayed with
the same employer instead are much smaller for both groups of women,
especially for women without children (ﬁg. 2c).
23 This contrasts with the estimates reported in Stewart and Swafﬁeld (2004),
which provide evidence of a female labor supply reduction of 1–2 hours per week
as a result of the introduction of the NMW in April 1999. Their results are not
robust across data sets and speciﬁcations and are obtained from data that stop in
September 2000 at the latest (i.e., just before the second post-WFTC year in our
sample). In addition, as pointed out in the introduction, the Stewart-Swafﬁeld
estimates refer to all women, so we do not know how single women with and
without children have been differentially affected by the minimum wage.436
Fig. 1.—Female weekly hours of work by survey year. The vertical line indicates hours
eligibility cutoff.437
Fig. 1( Continued)Fig. 2.—Average changes in total weekly hours of work: single childless women and lone
mothers by job-changing status. a, All workers. b, Job movers. c, Stayers.Job Changes and Hours Changes 439
Table 2
The Impact of the In-Work Beneﬁt Reforms and Job Changes
on Hours Changes
Without Controls (N p 12,359) With Controls (N p 12,359)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
a1 1.58
(7.94)
1.27
(2.68)
1.54
(3.51)
1.36
(2.98)
.34
(1.08)
.44
(.85)
.24
(.59)
.19
(.32)
a2 .77
(1.86)
.74
(1.78)
.73
(1.76)
.19
(.28)
.30
(.64)
.32
(.70)
.31
(.71)
.45
(.82)
bFC .25
(.40)
.03
(.07)
.03
(.01)
.21
(.44)
bWFTC .16
(.33)
.45
(.89)
.20
(.42)
.56
(.94)
bFC .11
(.08)
.72
(.51)
.95
(.67)
.48
(.29)
.21
(.15)
.83
(.59)
.89
(.62)
.44
(.28)
bWFTC 2.56
(2.46)
2.66
(2.56)
2.48
(2.29)
3.39
(2.82)
2.54
(2.51)
2.65
(2.63)
2.60
(2.47)
3.42
(2.92)
Source.—British Household Panel Survey, 1991–2002.
Note.—Absolute values of t-statistics (obtained from standard errors that are adjusted to reﬂect
multiple observations per person) are in parentheses. The labeling of cols. 1–4 corresponds to eqq. (1)–(4)
described in the text. Controls include a cubic polynomial in total work experience; dummy variables
for race, educational attainment, ﬁrm size, public sector, region of residence, housing tenure, union
coverage, and industry; the number and changes in the number of children by age group; and changes
in health status and local unemployment rate.
IV. Results
A. Benchmark Estimates
The estimates of the impact of job-changing behavior on hours changes
are shown in table 2. These are presented for the four speciﬁcations de-
scribed in Section II.B and separately for the cases in which the variables
in X are excluded or included.
24
The regressions without controls indicate that changing jobs is asso-
ciated with increases in women’s labor supply by less than 1 hour per
week (a2), although this effect is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level in the
ﬁrst three speciﬁcations, whereas single mothers experience signiﬁcantly
larger changes of about 1.5 hours per week (a1). The treatment effects for
stayers ( and ) are small and never statistically signiﬁcant, and bb FC WFTC
so are the average treatment effects for job movers afterthe 1992reduction
in hours requirement under FC (bFC). But the introduction of WFTC had
a strong impact on job movers with a signiﬁcant increase in their labor
supply by 2.5–3 hours per week on average. Importantly, from speciﬁ-
cation (4) we can reject the hypothesis that at the 5% ˆ ˆ b p b WFTC WFTC
level (the p-value of the t-test of equality is .024), which provides evidence
24 In parentheses, this and the subsequent tables report the absolute value of t-
ratios obtained from standard errors that are adjusted to reﬂect multiple obser-
vations per person (and are robust to arbitrary forms of serial correlation and
misspeciﬁcation). For the sake of brevity, the estimates on the control variables
are not reported but are available from the authors.440 Blundell et al.
of hours inﬂexibility within jobs. Most of these results are robust to the
inclusion of the control variables X, with the only exception of a1, which
now becomes statistically insigniﬁcant.
25 With 16% and 20% of women
changing jobs after the 1992 and 1999 reforms, respectively, we can derive
their overall effects on hours changes conditional on working: FC had
virtually no overall impact, whereas WFTC increased single mothers’
weekly hours of work by about 1.1 hours (speciﬁcation [4]).
Because ﬁgure 2 reveals that stayers also increased their worked hours
immediately after the 1999 reform, the previous analysis was repeated
after excluding the last two years of the sample. Indeed, the WFTC effect
for stayers is now larger and close to 1 extra hour per week, but its p-
value is never below .11. In any case, even after this selection, all other
results are conﬁrmed, including the rejection of the hypothesis of ﬂexi-
bility in hours within jobs.
26 Thus, in response to the exogenous change
in work incentives given by the WFTC program, changing jobs seemed
to have been the strongest mechanism of labor supply adjustment among
single mothers after 1999.
We repeated the previous analysis with a different subsample, in which
the control group of single childless women is limited to those with
educational qualiﬁcations below A level. In the spirit of the discussion in
Section II.B, this allows us to see whether our results are concentrated
in speciﬁc subgroups of the population that might have been affected by
other policy initiatives (such as the NDLP) that were introduced at ap-
proximately the same time as the WFTC reform. It also provides us with
an important sensitivity check. Restricting our analysis to this different
control group reduces only slightly the treatment effect for movers under
WFTC (bWFTC) to 3.28 (t-ratio p 2.86), changing neither the estimated
effect for movers under FC nor the treatment effects for stayers in any
signiﬁcant way. The results illustrated so far, therefore, are robust to this
change in the deﬁnition of the control group.
B. Heterogeneous Responses
It is possible that the labor supply responses to the policy reforms vary
by observable characteristics of the women in the treatment and control
groups. To allow for this, we look for heterogeneous responses by esti-
25 To understand this lack of effect, we estimated variants of eqq. (1)–(4) with
Q interacted with marital status (not shown). Regardless of whether we control
for group-speciﬁc time trends, changing jobs is associated with increases of about
1.2 hours per week for single mothers and with reductions of 0.8 hour per week
for single childless women.
26 We reach the same conclusion if we keep the entire sample as in table 2 but
redeﬁne the postreform period as either 1999–2000 or 1999–2001. Similarly, re-
deﬁning the FC period over 1992–93 (rather than 1992–94) does not alter our
baseline results.Job Changes and Hours Changes 441
mating models that distinguish women separately by individual attributes
(such as education and number and age of children), work-related attrib-
utes (such as ﬁrm size and industry), and stated labor supply preferences.
The results from these regressions (based on speciﬁcation [4] only) are
reported in table 3.
The estimates in panel A of the table reveal that the increase in hours
worked after the 1999 reform was predominantly observed among single
mothers who changed jobs and used to work fewer than 16 hours per
week. Women in this group experienced a labor supply increase in excess
of 6 hours per week, whereas women who already worked 16 or more
hours experienced a more modest growth of about 2 additional hours.
27
Both effects are signiﬁcantly different from zero, and they are statistically
different from each other at conventional levels (p-value p .006). These
results suggest that an important part of the overall treatment effect of
the 1999 reform was driven by greater entry into WFTC-eligible em-
ployment of already working single mothers. As the differences between
and document, there is evidence of a greater degree of hours inﬂex- ˆ ˆ b b
ibility within jobs after the WFTC reform for both groups of women
and, for women who worked fewer than 16 hours per week, also after
the 1992 FC reform (but this effect is signiﬁcant only at the 6% level).
The treatment effects for stayers do not differ between more educated
women and less educated women (panel B). There are, however, asym-
metric responses among movers. Less educated single mothers increased
their labor supply by 3–4 hours per week after the 1992 reform, whereas
more educated single mothers’ supply increased by 4–5 hours after the
1999 reform.
28 The null hypothesis that the estimated b and b coefﬁcients
are equal can be rejected at the 5% level during the WFTC regime among
the more educated and at the 10% level during the FC regime among the
less educated.
The next two panels demonstrate that the post-WFTC upward ad-
27 These estimates are also accompanied by a signiﬁcantly different impact of
changing jobs on hours changes for the two groups of women (a2). When moving
from one job to another, women in the bottom part of the hours distribution
faced an average increase of nearly 2 hours per week, whereas women in the top
part of the distribution reduced their labor supply by about 1 hour per week.
28 If a large proportion of better-educated single mothers had not been eligible
for WFTC, the effects reported in table 2 should be attributed to shocks other
than WFTC. However, using data from the Family Resources Survey, we ﬁnd
that tax credit eligibility has increased proportionally more for more educated
lone mothers than for the less educated after the introduction of WFTC (albeit
a greater fraction of the less educated are eligible). In particular, between 1995
and 1998, about 26% of better-educated lone mothers who work 16 or more
hours per week were eligible for FC. Between 2000 and 2002, 49% were eligible
for WFTC (an increase in eligibility rate by 88%). For the less educated, the
increase in eligibility rate was only 28% (from 65% to 83%).442
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justment in single mothers’ labor supply is primarily experienced by
mothers of one child aged 0–4. Albeit smaller, the effect observed for
mothers of children aged 5 or more is still sizable and signiﬁcant (panel
D). If we pool all women as we did in table 2 and interact the variable
on with the indicator of the youngest child being aged 0–4, this bFC
interaction term is negative and statistically signiﬁcant ( and b p 1.35 FC
standard error p 0.48), whereas the interaction with the indicator of the
youngest child being older is never signiﬁcant. This provides evidence
that the 1992 reform induced some groups of workers (in this case, single
mothers of young children who did not change jobs) to reduce theirhours
worked over the 1992–94 period.
The U.K. in-work beneﬁt system interacts with other welfare beneﬁts
(Blundell and Hoynes 2004). One of these is Housing Beneﬁt, which
works as a rent subsidy. If a single mother receives Housing Beneﬁt, she
would beneﬁt less from a given amount of tax credit because this is treated
as income in other means-tested programs. Rents in some parts of the
country (in particular, London and the South East) are high and have
rapidly increased over the 1990s, whereas owner-occupiers are not eligible
for Housing Beneﬁt. To capture part of the relationship betweenHousing
Beneﬁt and the tax credits of interest here, we stratiﬁed our sample by
region of residence (London and the South East in one group and the
rest of the country in the other) and by housing tenure (owner-occupier
or not), both measured at . For the sake of brevity, the results are t  1
not shown but are availablefrom theauthors.Fromthisanalysisitemerges
that labor supply adjustments observed after the 1999 reform were greater
for single mothers who lived outside the London/South East region
(where house rents are lower and the interaction with Housing Beneﬁt
is likely to be more modest) and who were not owner-occupiers.
29
Job-speciﬁc characteristics provide other important sources of hetero-
geneity for the impact of job changes on hours changes after the 1999
reform. The strongest treatment effects are found for single mothers em-
ployed in relatively larger establishments (on the order of 4 additional
hours per week, panel E), in service industries (about 3 extra hours, panel
F),
30 and equally for those employed in the private sector or the public
29 Stratifying the sample jointly by region and house tenure leads to small
subsamples. But when we performed the analysis on the entire sample and in-
cluded an interaction term between these two variables, the largest increases in
worked hours occurred in association with changing jobs after the introduction
of WFTC for single mothers who lived in rented accommodations outside the
London/South East region.
30 Single mothers who were employed in manufacturing industries also showed
a signiﬁcant increase of 3 hours of work per week if they changed jobs after the
introduction of WFTC (panel F). For the same group of women there is also
evidence (signiﬁcant only at the 10% level) of positive labor supply adjustmentsJob Changes and Hours Changes 445
sector (between 3 and 4 additional hours per week, panel G). Strong
evidence of hours inﬂexibility emerges among lone mothers who work
in larger ﬁrms, service industries, and the public sector.
31
Another important dimension along which we expect to see hetero-
geneous responses is given by stated labor supply preferences. At each
interview, the BHPS asks respondents whether they would like to work
fewer hours or more hours or continue to work the same number of
hours “assuming that they would be paid the same amount per hour.”
We use this information to construct three labor supply preference var-
iables for any given year of the sample period, labeled OVER (one if a
worker would like to work fewer hours, and zero otherwise), UNDER
(one if a worker would like to work more hours, and zero otherwise),
and SAME (one if a worker would like to continue to work the same
number of hours, and zero otherwise).
32 We expect that workers who are
overemployed/underemployed at one point in time reduce/increase their
worked hours over time, and those who want to continue working the
same number of hours do not change their labor supply. The estimates
on a2 reported in panel H of table 3 conﬁrm such expectations, with
overemployed workers reducing their labor supply by 3 hours per week
on average, underemployed workers increasing it by about 4 hours, and
the remaining group of workers showing no signiﬁcant change. The 1992
of about 1.6 hours per week if they changed jobs between 1992 and 1994 (i.e.,
during the FC regime). This effect involves only 25% of the whole sample, and
this may be why it does not show up in the baseline estimates of table 2 for the
whole sample. Manufacturing production is based on technologies that are tra-
ditionally less ﬂexible than those used in services, such as batch methods and
robotized assembly lines (Goldin and Katz 1998), which may be reﬂected in a
greater rigidity in (downward) adjustments in hours.
31 To capture occupation-speciﬁc human capital, we examined some further
interaction terms constructed using the Standard OccupationClassiﬁcation(SOC)
measure. In particular, we partitioned the sample into two occupation groups,
i.e., “white-collar” occupations (i.e., managerial, professional, and technical oc-
cupations, corresponding to major groups 1–3 in the one-digit SOC system) and
“blue-collar” occupations (i.e., clerical/secretarial occupations,crafts,personalser-
vice, sales, semiskilled, and unskilled, SOC groups 4–9). The results were similar
to those for education and industry, with women in white-collar occupations
showing a greater positive response after the 1999 reform (signiﬁcant) and a
negativeresponse after the1992reform(notsigniﬁcant).Allotherestimatesremain
broadly similar to those already reported. These additional results are available
from the authors on request.
32 Over the whole sample period, about 19% of lone mothers report being
overemployed, 18% report being underemployed, and the remaining 62% report
being satisﬁed with their hours of work. The corresponding proportions for single
women without children are 28%, 11%, and 61%. When all women in the sample
are considered, the most mobile are the underemployed (with 27% of themchang-
ing jobs in any two consecutive years), and the job-changing rates for the over-
employed and the other group of workers are lower (19% and 15%, respectively).446 Blundell et al.
and 1999 in-work beneﬁts reforms did not affect hours workedbywomen
who would have liked to keep working the same number of hours and
did not change jobs. But single mothers who wanted to continue working
the same number of hours showed large upward labor supply adjustments
of about 4 hours per week if they changed jobs after the WFTC reform.
33
Thus, initially “unconstrained” (i.e., neither over- nor underemployed)
lone mothers did respond to the greater work incentives of the WFTC
program, but only through a change of job.
34 This upholds our previous
ﬁnding that there is evidence of hours inﬂexibility within jobs.
The 1999 reform also led to increases of 1–3 hours per week among
both overemployed and underemployed workers who changed jobs, al-
though none of such increases is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. After the 1992 reform, instead, we observe large (and signiﬁcant
at the 10% level) reductions of about 7 hours per week among over-
employed single mothers who changed jobs. This lines up very well with
the 8-hour fall in the minimum work requirement to receive FC (from
24 to 16 hours a week). Again, this labor supply adjustment occurs
through movements across (rather than within) jobs, although equality
tests of the estimated b and b coefﬁcients can be rejected only at the 10%
level, irrespective of the speciﬁcation. Underemployed workers seem to
be unable to adjust their labor supply upward if they did not change jobs.
But those who moved did manage to increase their worked hours even
after the 1992 reform by about 3 hours per week (although this increase
is not statistically signiﬁcant).
35
We reestimated variants of equations (1)–(4) over the whole sample of
women that included interaction terms between the variables on and bj
bj ( , WFTC) and stated labor supply preferences. The results from j p FC
this analysis (not shown) conﬁrm those previously discussed. Inparticular
(from speciﬁcation [4]), unconstrained single mothers who changed jobs
after the 1999 reform increased labor supply by about 4 hours (t-value p
33 The hypothesis that the estimated b and b coefﬁcients are equal canberejected
at the 5% level (p-value p .027).
34 Notice that “unconstrained” workers are deﬁned to be those who would like
to continue to work the same number of hours. This deﬁnition may not precisely
reﬂect their entire preference ordering, since they may be constrained in other
dimensions (e.g., job location and family responsibilities).
35 Following Altonji and Paxson (1992) and Euwals (2001), we also checked
whether the hours adjustments estimated in conjunction with the WFTC reform
are in line with women’s stated preferences. The results (which are not reported
for convenience) show that this is the case, especially for underemployed lone
mothers. Almost 80% of single mothers who wanted to work more did adjust
their hours upward by changing jobs after the 1999 reform as opposed to only
30% among those who did not change jobs. The corresponding downward ad-
justments for women who wanted to work fewer hours were instead 55% and
18% for movers and stayers, respectively.Job Changes and Hours Changes 447
Table 4
Robustness Checks—Speciﬁcation (4)
Accounting
for FC*
(1)
Length of Time in
the Panel†
Propensity Score Matching
Models‡
6 Years
or More
(2)
9 Years
or More
(3)
Biweight
Kernel
Matching
(4)
Local Linear
Regression
Matching
(5)
a1 .30
(.69)
.57
(1.20)
.66
(1.13)
.97
(.89)
1.05
(1.36)
a2 .56
(.88)
.81
(1.56)
.60
(.88)
1.12
(1.53)
.20
(.51)
bFC .12
(.11)
.45
(.80)
.27
(.40)
.13
(.11)
.38
(.75)
§ bFC .22
(.44)
bWFTC .24
(.48)
.81
(1.54)
.75
(1.02)
.49
(.90)
.97
(1.13)
bFC .81
(.52)
.65
(.50)
.17
(.23)
.36
(.48)
.3
(.62)
bFC
§ 1.18
(1.32)
bWFTC 3.48
(3.13)
4.52
(3.34)
2.99
(2.39)
3.12
(3.07)
3.07
(2.74)
Observations 12,359 8,314 5,153 12,359 12,359
Note.—Absolute values of t-statistics (obtained from standard errors that are adjusted to reﬂect
multiple observations per person) are in parentheses. All regressions include the control variables used
in table 2. For other deﬁnitions, see the note to table 2.
* These estimates are obtained from a regression accounting for the 1995 reform that provided extra
credit for working 30 or more hours.
† The categories 6 years or more and 9 years or more include only women who have been observed
for at least 6 years and 9 years consecutively in the panel, respectively.
‡ Absolute values of t-statistics (with standard errors obtained from 500 bootstrapped replications)
are in parentheses. For the local linear regression matching regression, the estimates are obtained after
imposing a tricube kernel.
§ Extra credit for full-time work.
4.61), and overemployed single mothers who moved across jobs after the
1992 reform reduced their hours by about 7 a week (t-value p 2.41).
Further interactions with indicators of the age of the youngest child reveal
that mothers of younger children (aged 0–4) who moved jobs experienced
the greatest changes in hours conditional on working. In particular, after
the introduction of WFTC, unconstrained mothers whose youngest child
was aged 0–4 and who changed jobs worked nearly 5.5 extra hours (t-
value p 3.27) as opposed to 3 among unconstrained motherswhoseyoun-
gest child was aged 5–18. Similarly, after the FC reform, overemployed
single mothers with younger children reduced their labor supply by 9
hours a week as compared to 5.6 among mothers of older children.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
We performed a number of sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the
robustness of the results. For the sake of brevity table 4 presents the448 Blundell et al.
results only from three exercises using speciﬁcation (4). The results ob-
tained from the other speciﬁcations are qualitatively similar to those dis-
cussed here.
36
First, we performed our analysis accounting for the 1995 FC reform
that provided extra credit for full-time work. The estimates in column 1
conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings and document that the 1995 reform was
followed by no sizable change in worked hours irrespective of whether
women changed employers or stayed in the same job.
As mentioned in Section III, there may be concerns with changing
sample composition over time, differential attrition, and missing data.
Besides using weighted data, which provided results similar to those pre-
sented so far, we addressed these concerns by reestimating our models
only on women who have been successfully interviewed for a given num-
ber of times (e.g., six or more waves). If attrition or changing sample
composition is important, the results from such selected subsamples are
expected to differ from those discussed earlier. Columns 2 and 3 of table
4 report the estimates found from two subsamples, one in which we
include only women who have been observed for 6 or more years (i.e.,
at least half of the time between 1991 and 2002) and the other in which
women have to be observed for at least nine consecutive times. In general,
the estimates from both subsamples are relatively close to the correspond-
ing ﬁgures reported in table 2. For example, bWFTC, one of the key pa-
rameters in our study, is estimated to be 32% greater (col. 2) and 13%
smaller (col. 3) than its counterpart in table 2. Despite such differences
in magnitude, therefore, these estimates tend to support our previous
results, suggesting that missing data problems are likely to have only
minor consequences for our analysis.
Finally, we estimated the effects using propensity score matching (bi-
weight kernel and local linear regression matching). Although, like stan-
dard OLS regressions, matching methods rely on a selection-on-observ-
ables assumption (Angrist and Krueger 1999), they limit the potential bias
due to differences in the support of X between single mothers and women
withoutchildren and thebiasduetothedifferencebetweenthetwogroups
of women in the distribution of X over its common support (Heckman
et al. 1998). The estimates in columns 4 and 5 of table 4 display patterns
that are very similar to those illustrated above in this section.
D. Wage Estimates
The evidence so far indicates that British single mothers responded to
the greater work incentives of the 1999 in-work beneﬁts reform by sub-
36 We also reestimated the models eliminating laid-off workers from Q or drop-
ping promoted workers from the group of stayers. Both these exercises produced
results that were virtually identical to those shown in table 2 and are thus not
reported.Job Changes and Hours Changes 449
stantially increasing their hours of paid work, whereas the two previous
reforms to FC seemed to have induced only minor labor supply effects.
The strong labor supply adjustment in conjunction with the introduction
of WFTC was primarily achieved through a change of employer rather
than changes in hours within the same job. This ﬁnding suggests that
single mothers face some form of hours inﬂexibility within jobs. Against
this background, we analyze wage responses. Of course, in-work beneﬁts
reforms were directly designed to change the incentive to work speciﬁc
hours leaving wages unaltered, whereas wage determination was affected
more explicitly by the introduction of the NMW, and both hours and
wages were (and still are) under employers’ control, and so our partial-
equilibrium analysis is likely to provide biased estimates. Nonetheless,
gauging wage responses is important because it gives us a more complete
picture of the British labor market and some indication of the possible
presence of labor market imperfections or rigidities in the matching tech-
nology. We therefore estimated equations (1)–(4) with log hourly wages
(expressed in 2002 prices) as the dependent variable and the same set of
explanatory variables used before. A number of checks, which were per-
formed to test the robustness of such speciﬁcations, led to results that
have the same qualitative implications as those reported here.
For both job movers and stayers and both the 1992 and 1999 reforms,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant wage effect. There is also relatively little effect
heterogeneity across different groups of women. Two important excep-
tions, however, are single mothers who lived in London and the South
East and those who worked in small establishments. Among the former
group of women, changing jobs after the introduction of WFTC implied
not only a labor supply increase of almost 3 hours per week (t-ratio p
3.11) but also a wage reduction of 2.7% (t-value p 2.23). Among the
latter, changing jobs after the 1999 reform led to 1.5% lower wages (t-
value p 1.51) and modest positive hours changes (see table 3). Thus,
despite the presence of hours inﬂexibility, the labor market generally
operates quite competitively, although there is an indication of monop-
sony among some groups of single mothers.
V. Conclusions
By using three in-work beneﬁts reforms during the 1990s in the United
Kingdom, which either changed hours requirements to be eligible for the
beneﬁts or increased the attractiveness of working a given number of
hours, we are able to assess the mechanism of labor supply adjustment
among single women with children—the main target of these in-work
beneﬁt reforms. We ﬁnd that the 1992 and 1995 FC reforms had modest
impacts on single mothers’ hours of work, but the introduction of the
WFTC reform in 1999 had large positive effects on their number of hours450 Blundell et al.
of work. This increase is largely driven by women who changed jobs,
suggesting that the mechanism of labor supply adjustments is between
rather than within jobs. This lines up well with the estimates we get when
we look at hours changes by stated labor supply preferences: uncon-
strained women who changed jobs showed the largest hours increases
after the 1999 reform, and overemployed women substantially reduced
their hours worked after the 1992 reform (which did reduce the minimum
work requirement to receive FC from 24 to 16 hours a week) only if they
moved across jobs. There is evidence of considerable heterogeneity in the
effects of the WFTC reform for different groups of women. The strongest
evidence of hours inﬂexibility within jobs emerged among single mothers
whose youngest child was aged 0–4. This was especially the case for those
who worked in larger ﬁrms, service industries, and the public sector.
Although there is little in the way of overall wage effects, we do ﬁnd that
after the introduction of WFTC, hourly wages decreased signiﬁcantly for
single women who lived in London and the South East and moved jobs
and, to a lesser extent, for movers who worked in small ﬁrms.
So what remains of the canonical labor supply model? We have shown
that adjustments in hours of work are made primarily by movements
between jobs, and there is little evidence of systematic labor sup-
ply–induced hours movements within jobs. Our analysis of stated pref-
erences conﬁrms this further, showing that responses are greater among
those who say that they are unconstrained as well as among those who
are constrained but state that they would like to move in the direction
suggested by the incentives. Thus, a labor supply model emerges in which
hours adjustments are largely made by moving between workplaces. This
could be achieved within an “adapted” canonical model in which estab-
lishments are organized around hours requirements and individuals move
jobs to achieve hours ﬂexibility. Of course, it could also be supported by
theories that emphasize the importance of labor market frictions and
imperfections, such as job search, wage-job packages, and/or dynamic
monopsony. However, if there were such “imperfections,” we would ex-
pect them to be displayed in wage responses. The evidence is that such
responses are not large and overall not statistically signiﬁcant. Conse-
quently, at least to aﬁrstapproximation,anadaptedcanonicallaborsupply
model with hours ﬂexibility across jobs cannot be rejected. Nonetheless,
our results by region and ﬁrm size suggest that production technology
or employer preferences not only may reduce labor supply ﬂexibility
within ﬁrms but also may placeconstraintsonhoursmobilityacrossﬁrms.
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